## Formal Verification of Division and Square Root Implementations, an Oracle Report

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October 6, 2016






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### Goal

- Verify data-path for new implementations of:
  - 32/64-bit floating-point division and square root
    - fdivd
    - fdivs
    - fsqrtd
    - fsqrts
  - 32/64-bit integer divide
    - udivx
    - sdivx
    - udiv
    - sdiv



### **The Problem and Key Result**





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### Tools

- ACL2
  - Programming language written in subset of Lisp
  - Theorem prover written in ACL2
    - Proof engine used at AMD, IBM, Centaur, Motorola, Intel
    - 2005 ACM Software System Award
  - Maintained at Univ. of Texas with help from community
- ACL2 Books (~5500)
  - A "book" is a library of functions and lemmas
    - Arithmetic, RTL, security, proof and definition utilities
  - Includes a Verilog parser and hardware symbolic simulator
- Support Tools: SAT solvers, waveform viewer



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
### **Related Work**

- Symbolic trajectory evaluation (Intel)
  - C.-J. H. Seger and R. E. Bryant, "Formal verification by symbolic evaluation of partiallyordered trajectories," Formal Methods in System Design, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 147–189, Mar. 1995.
- Floating-point verification
  - D. Russinoff, "A mechanically checked proof of IEEE compliance of the floating-point" multiplication, division, and square root algorithms of the AMD-K7<sup>TM</sup> processor," *London* Mathematics Society Journal of Computation and Mathematics, no. 1, pp. 148–200, 1998.
  - J. O'Leary, X. Zhao, R. Gerth, and C.-J. H. Seger, "Formally verifying IEEE compliance of floating-point hardware," Intel Technology Journal, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1–14, 1999.
- Hardware verification and tools
  - A. Slobodova, J. Davis, S. Swords, and W. A. Hunt, "A flexible formal verification framework" for industrial scale validation," in Formal Methods and Models for Codesign (MEMOCODE), 2011 9th IEEE/ACM International Conference on, July 2011, pp. 89–97.



### Outline

- Intro
- Algorithm extraction
- Algorithm verification
- Reflections and challenges



 Goal: raise level of abstraction from low-level bit operations to higher-level operations like \*, +, and ~ of *m*-bit operands

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
### Abstraction

result [63:0]

float-exceptions [4:0]


int-overflow

- Decompose circuit into appropriately-sized blocks
- Choose modules of interest
  - For example:
    - Tree of carry-save adders (CSAs)
    - Nest of Booth encoders






- Decompose circuit into appropriately-sized blocks
- (1) Black-box chosen modules
  - Write specification for those modules in ACL2
  - Automatically verify the validity of those specifications using GL
    - GL uses BDDs and SAT solvers "under the hood"






- Decompose circuit into appropriately-sized blocks
- (2) Create ACL2 version of the interconnect
  - For example:
    - The wires that connect the CSAs are connected in a particular way
  - ACL2 version of interconnect is unverified at this point






- Decompose circuit into appropriately-sized blocks
- (3) Prove a higher-level specification
  - Define a higher-level specification for the connected modules
  - Prove specification's validity using Boyer-Moore rewriting
  - For example:
    - sum+carry\*2 = a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h






### 10

- Decompose circuit into appropriately-sized blocks
- (4) Black-box your larger piece of circuitry
  - Prove that the ACL2 interconnect is the same as the Verilog interconnect
    - I.E., that the Verilog wires really do connect the CSA's that way!






- Decompose circuit into appropriately-sized blocks
- (4) Black-box your larger piece of circuitry
  - Black-boxing doesn't scale using Esim and GL
  - Use SV (successor to Esim) in our latest work
    - Scales better but we still have problems too large





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- Intro
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• Goal: show that the Goldschmidt algorithm (consisting of operations like \*, +, and ~ of *m*-bit operands), rounding, and exceptions implement IEEE 754

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### **IEEE754 Specification in ACL2**

- IEEE754 Standard on Floating-Point Arithmetic
  - 80-page document written in English
- Our IEEE 754 specification in ACL2 includes
  - Div, sqrt, add, mul, and fused mul-add
  - All special values (+/- 0, +/-Infinity, NaNs)
  - All exception flags
  - Denormals
  - Four rounding modes
  - Customization for NaN values
- Validated our spec against millions of test vectors from Oracle's test suite



### **Goldschmidt Algorithm for Division**

Idea: choose T, r<sub>i</sub> such that


$$\frac{A}{B} * \frac{T}{T} * \frac{r_0}{r_0} * \frac{r_1}{r_1} * \frac{r_2}{r_2} * \frac{r_3}{r_3} \dots \xrightarrow{-}$$

- Precision doubles with each iteration
- Algorithm:



## Q 1

### **Main Proof Obligation**



-max\_error < final\_approx - A/B < max\_error ?

- Each step introduces an error
  - Lookup:  $T \sim 1/B$ . Define relative error *u* by T = 1/B u/B
  - Each multiplication, except last, is truncated from 2*M* to *M* bits. Error  $eps_i$  is in [0, 2<sup>-M</sup>)
  - 2  $d_{i+1}$  is implemented by taking one's complement of  $d_{i+1}$ . This introduces fixed error 2<sup>-M</sup>
- Golden question: Is error in final approximation small enough to yield an IEEE754 answer after rounding is applied?



### s in [0, 2<sup>-M</sup>) fixed error 2<sup>-M</sup> ⁄ield an

### **Error Analysis**

- Express (final approx A/B) as a multivariate polynomial in u (lookup error) and eps<sub>i</sub> (truncation error)
- This polynomial can be generated symbolically from the algorithm
- Given the interval for each variable, compute interval for (final approx A/B) using methods from interval arithmetic
- Example: If lookup error u was only error, then final error for, e.g., final approx =  $n_2$  can be expressed as

final approx -  $A/B = A^*T^*(-u^4 - u^5 - u^6 ...) + inc$ 

with *u* in  $[-2^{-k}, 2^{-k}]$  and  $A^*T < 2$ .



### **Results of Error Analysis**

• Proved main obligation using interval arithmetic

```
-max_error < final_approx - A/B < max_error
```

- We first implemented interval arithmetic in Java<sup>™</sup> and later verified computations in ACL2
- We then experimented with reduced lookup tables to see if main obligation still holds.
- This approach reduced the lookup table
  - for division by 50%
  - for square root by 75%



# obligation still

### **Reflections and Challenges**

- Approach is very similar to Symbolic Trajectory Evaluation (STE)
  - Works very well for data-path verification
  - Technical challenges involving Step 4 of Extraction (recomposition)
- Invariant-based methods
  - More thorough but more time-consuming
  - Necessary for verifying control logic
  - Can community make invariant-based frameworks and methodologies more efficient for users?
    - Currently too time-consuming for industry to use on major products with deadlines
- A dream: automatically infer higher-level specifications for Verilog implementations



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
### **Backup Slides**



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### Interval Arithmetic Intermezzo

- Function of single input variable
  - For each input interval, compute output interval



 Computing the output interval for multivariate polynomials is similar to computing the output interval for univariate polynomials

